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The lasting impact of the mortgage crisis of 2008 on the US economy 
and international financial markets has spurred an intense debate 
among economists and policymakers about the origins of the crisis. 
The collapse of collateral values post- 2007 led to a large increase in de-
faults, which in turn disrupted banks and the shadow banking system 
and was a leading cause of the deep recession that followed. Even af-
ter large  government- stabilization programs, low house prices and de-
pressed expectations held back investment and consumption. The rapid 
increase in household debt over the first decade of the  twenty- first 
century, especially mortgage credit, has been widely documented, but 
views differ on what drove this expansion in credit. This paper outlines 
the two major narratives that have been proposed to explain the crisis 
and lays out the evidence that aims to differentiate them. We call these 
the subprime view and the expectations view of the boom and bust. We 
provide new facts and confirm several prior findings on the evolution 
of debt, homeownership rates, debt- to- income (DTI) ratios, and loan- 
to- value (LTV) ratios during both the housing boom and the housing 
bust.1 The results support the idea that house prices and house price 
expectations played a central role in both the expansion of credit and 
the subsequent housing market bust.
One view of the housing boom and bust is that financial innovation 
and deregulation in the precrisis period led to increased securitization 
and delegation in underwriting, which in turn exacerbated agency 
problems within the mortgage origination chain and led to distortions 
in underwriting (the subprime view). A number of theory papers have 
laid out particular channels by which these distortions might have af-
fected mortgage lending, such as Parlour and Plantin (2008), Dang, Gor-
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ton, and Holmström (2010), and Chemla and Hennessy (2014). Popular 
narratives (such as Michael Lewis’s The Big Short in 2015 and the 2010 
movie Inside Job) put forward the idea that increased misalignment of 
incentives led financial institutions to provide unsustainable credit to 
low- income and poor- credit- quality borrowers, so- called subprime bor-
rowers, who previously might have been rationed out of the mortgage 
market (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi 2015).
The alternative view emphasizes the role of house price expectations 
in explaining the increased credit supply (the expectations view). Ac-
cording to this view, inflated house price expectations led banks to un-
derestimate the potential for losses and the losses given default. Inflated 
house price expectations might also have led borrowers to increase de-
mand for housing and exploit the expanded credit supply.2 However, 
heterogeneous priors about house prices by themselves do not lead to 
boom- and- bust cycles because prices would immediately adjust, and 
the impact of optimistic agents in the housing market must vary over 
time in order to generate those cycles. One channel through which the 
role of optimistic agents changes endogenously over the business cycle 
is changes in  collateral- lending standards.3 Looser collateral standards 
after periods of good performance in the housing market (higher com-
bined loan- to- value ratios [CLTVs]) can allow more optimistic agents to 
hold a larger fraction of assets and, as a result, drive up house prices.4 
An alternative channel proposes that the number of optimistic agents 
changes with the credit cycle. For example, if house price expectations 
are extrapolative or adaptive, initial increases in house prices can feed 
on themselves; see, for example, Barberis et al. (2015), Lo (2004), Gen-
naioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015), or DeFusco, Nathanson, and Zwick 
(2017). Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (forthcoming) provide a dif-
ferent microfoundation via social contagion, where optimistic agents 
with tighter priors can convince less optimistic agents to change their 
beliefs.
What might have triggered these initial changes in house prices and 
expectations? The savings glut that led to increasing capital inflows to 
the United States and lower interest rates is often seen as a trigger for 
increasing house prices (see, in particular, Bernanke 2007; Rajan 2011; 
Bhutta 2015). These might have been exaggerated by demographic 
trends in mobility (Ferreira and Gyourko 2011) or gentrification trends 
(Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst 2013).
It is important to understand the primary drivers of the recent boom- 
and- bust cycle in household leverage, since it not only affects the diag-
This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:40:48 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Dynamics of Housing Debt in the Recent Boom and Great Recession 267
nosis but also suggests different policy changes to guard against future 
crises. If the first view dominates, then regulations that force lenders to 
have more skin in the game, reduce securitization, and impose stricter 
screening of (marginal) borrowers are central. Under the second view, 
the focus needs to be on macroprudential regulation and rules that sup-
port the stability of banks, even when asset values change or may be 
overinflated.5
The discussion above illustrates the challenges of differentiating be-
tween the subprime view and the expectations view of the crisis. The 
explanations are not mutually exclusive and may even reinforce each 
other. If, for example, market participants believe that house prices can 
only rise, they may not see a need to screen borrowers because higher 
house prices protect the lender. As a result, changes in house price ex-
pectations may themselves trigger changes in lending standards, and 
the loosening of credit standards might be the result of rising house 
price expectations rather than the cause of those increases.6 The chal-
lenge of cleanly testing these models lies not only in the common prob-
lem that economic outcomes are endogenously determined, but also in 
that expectations are generally not observed.
We show, however, that the expectations view and the subprime view 
have several defining differences. A central prediction of the subprime 
view is that a relaxation in credit standards leads to  cross- sectional dislo-
cations in credit flows toward poorer and subprime borrowers, as Mian 
and Sufi (2009) point out. As a result, aggregate credit flows, DTI ra-
tios, and even LTV ratios should increase disproportionately for these 
marginal groups, independent of house price increases. We show that, 
instead, and in line with the expectations view, areas with rapid house 
price increases saw the bulk of the credit expansion and similar in-
creases in homeownership rates. In these areas, homeowners also took 
on more credit by accelerating the speed with which they sell and buy 
homes (churn) and obtain cash- out refinances. Importantly, though, 
the credit expansion was not particularly concentrated in low- credit- 
score or low- income borrowers. At the same time, the distribution of 
LTV ratios at origination (i.e., the LTV ratios of the new purchases) re-
mained unchanged over the boom period, suggesting that lenders took 
the higher house prices at face value and lent in response to higher house 
values (higher “Vs”)7. After the onset of the crisis, however, defaults 
went up disproportionately in areas where house prices dropped most 
significantly, and  middle- income and  average- credit- score borrowers 
saw a very large increase in their share of total defaults. In what follows, 
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we provide a comprehensive analysis of the credit dynamics of the re-
cent boom- and- bust cycle.
Credit Flows, Stock, and DTI. We first document that there were no 
significant  cross- sectional dislocations in either aggregate credit flows 
or the stock of household debt across income or FICO bins. Using loan- 
level data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and Lender 
Processing Services (LPS), we confirm that the flow of new (purchase) 
mortgage credit across the income and credit score distribution was 
stable over the period 2001–2007 (consistent with evidence in Adelino, 
Schoar, and Severino [2016]). Of course, the dollar amount of purchase 
mortgage credit grew significantly over this time, but it did so for all 
income and FICO- score groups. Credit flows, however, may tell only an 
incomplete story of the stock of household leverage if households across 
income groups: (a) differentially retire or refinance existing debt, (b) in-
crease how quickly they buy and sell houses (churn), or (c) change the 
likelihood of entering into homeownership. Therefore, we first use Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data, which track the entire stock of 
mortgage debt, including purchase mortgages, second liens, and other 
home equity lines to show that the stock of DTI at the household level 
increased proportionally across the income distribution. Foote, Loew-
enstein, and Willen (2016) confirm this finding using Equifax data. We 
then use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) to create 
a proxy for the household’s debt burden. We look at housing cost as a 
proportion of income as a measure of the household’s mortgage debt 
burden, including second liens and other home equity lines. We show 
that housing costs as a share of income moved together for all home-
owners in the data with the exception of households at the very top of 
the income distribution.
The ACS data also allow us to break out the increase in homeowner-
ship cost by states with  above- and  below- median house price appre-
ciation. We find a much higher increase in the cost of ownership for 
people in high- appreciation areas compared to low- appreciation areas; 
for example, for the middle 60% of households by income, the cost of 
owning increases by 6–8 percentage points of income more in these ar-
eas than in low- appreciation areas between 2001 and 2006. This increase 
is entirely reversed by 2011. These results suggest that the changes in 
the cost of homeownership are fundamentally tied to area house price 
movements. A very similar picture emerges when we look at house val-
ues as a share of income.
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While this is separate from the subprime view of the crisis, one might 
wonder whether DTI ratios and observable characteristics of house-
holds capture the full story of the mortgage expansion. For example, 
did credit flow to households that were “marginal” borrowers on un-
observable dimensions (e.g., due to unobserved future income risk)? 
Testing for unobservable characteristics is difficult by definition, but 
we can analyze whether mortgage acceptance rates within DTI bins 
increased during this period. In figure A1 of the appendix, we show 
that the acceptance rate of mortgage applications within DTI bins did 
not go up during the boom. In fact, we see a slight downward trend, 
especially for the higher income groups. Given that approval rates con-
ditional on income bins did not change significantly, it is unlikely that 
there was a massive change in the selection on unobservables at the 
same time.
Homeownership Rates. Second, using ACS data on homeownership 
rates, we show that the boom made homeownership less accessible for 
the  lowest- income households. Starting in 2001, low- income house-
holds entered homeownership at lower rates than  middle- and high- 
income households, and households above the 20th percentile all saw 
similar increases in homeownership over the period. When we break 
out the results by areas with fast and slow house price growth, we find 
that the results hold similarly in both types of areas. But the steep de-
cline in ownership rates for the  lowest- income group already starts in 
2001 for areas with low house price appreciation. These results are con-
sistent across three  large- scale census surveys (the ACS, the American 
Housing Survey, and the Consumer Population Survey). The patterns 
are also consistent with Acolin et al. (2017), who show that subprime 
lending was not associated with increases in homeownership rates, and 
with Foote, Loewenstein, and Willen (2016), who use the SCF and find 
no increases in homeownership for low- income households. These re-
sults contradict the view that distortions in credit originations occurred 
at the extensive margin (Mian and Sufi 2016), and that lax lending stan-
dards allowed low- income households, who previously were rationed 
out of the market, to become homeowners. It also suggests that in the 
post- 2000 period, the Community Reinvestment Act did not achieve its 
goal of increasing homeownership of  lower- income households.
Cost of Renting Relative to the Cost of Owning. Third, using ACS 
data, we show that the gap in the cost of renting versus that of owning 
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(for recent movers) was relatively close at the beginning of the  twenty- 
first century, but it increases to 4% of income on average at the peak 
of the boom. After the onset of the crisis, this gap drops by a full 10% 
of income. For households in the second income quintile, rental costs 
jump the most and become higher than the cost of owning. These pat-
terns are consistent with the expectations view as in Kaplan, Mitman, 
and Violante (2016), where future house price appreciation sustains the 
divergence between costs of renting and owning. The results also sug-
gest that, once the crisis started, large parts of the housing stock were 
tied up in foreclosures and drove up rental costs, especially for low- 
income households.
Churn. Another channel through which households can lever up is by 
increasing how quickly they move into new (potentially larger) homes. 
Each time a household moves, it typically repays an older (and usually 
lower LTV and DTI) mortgage and gets a new mortgage, which resets 
the mortgage to a new and higher level. We show that the rate at which 
owners moved into new homes peaked in 2006, with approximately 
8% of households moving in each year. This rate increased in lockstep 
across the income distribution. Low- income households had lower lev-
els of churn relative to  higher- income ones during the boom, 6% versus 
9%, respectively. For all income groups, the rate of movement drops to 
about 5% during the crisis period and returns to about 6% by 2015. This 
is in line with the notion that optimistic homeowners exploited increas-
ing house prices by flipping houses more quickly and using the capital 
gains in one property as a down payment for a larger home (Stein 1995). 
For example, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) show that the fraction of 
homeowners who are very optimistic about house prices doubled be-
tween 2004 and 2006 (from 10% to 20% of the population).
LTV. To better understand the role that house prices played in increas-
ing DTI levels during the boom period, we analyze CLTV levels, a cen-
tral parameter in determining the tightness of collateralized lending.8 
We use data from CoreLogic (formerly DataQuick) for this analysis. A 
number of theories suggest that increases in house prices play an im-
portant role in explaining household leverage via LTV levels (Makarov 
and Plantin [2013, Landvoigt, Piazessi and Schneider [2015]). Interest-
ingly, the distribution of CLTV levels at origination between 2001 and 
2007 was very stable, with almost no changes over time. The median 
home purchase had a CLTV of 90%, and loans at the 90th percentile of 
leverage had a CLTV of almost 100%, even at the beginning of the first 
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decade of the  twenty- first century. Maybe even more surprisingly, there 
are no pronounced differences in the evolution of CLTV ratios when 
we split the data by areas with high and low house price growth or 
by level of house price. These results are consistent with Ferreira and 
Gyourko (2015), who use similar data and track CLTVs of households 
at origination and over time. Taken together, these results do not sup-
port a view that lenders relaxed collateral constraints by significantly 
changing CLTV ratios. Instead, lenders seem to have lent against in-
creased home prices without factoring in the risk that  house- price levels 
could be too high or that there might be a house price downturn. This 
view is supported by Cheng, Raina, and Xiong (2014), who use personal 
home transaction data to show that midlevel managers in securitized 
finance did not seem to anticipate the housing downturn. Also in line 
with the idea that lenders passively lent against increased house prices 
but otherwise did not significantly increase access to finance for mar-
ginal borrowers, we find that households in all income quintiles who 
purchase homes have similar (and small) drops terms of the stability of 
employment over the boom. While  higher- income households are more 
likely to have at least one member of the family employed full time, 
these differences between income levels did not change over the boom. 
However, at the onset of the mortgage crisis, we see a sudden spike in 
the share of households with full- time employment, which most likely 
reflects the tightening of credit during the Great Recession.
Defaults. Finally, when looking at ex post defaults, Adelino et al. (2016) 
show that  middle- income and prime borrowers all sharply increase their 
share of total delinquencies in the crisis compared to precrisis patterns. 
This sharp increase, moreover, is concentrated in prime borrowers in high 
house appreciation areas in the boom (see also Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 
[2009], who show that near-prime borrowers had a larger proportional 
increase in delinquency rates than subprimme ones, Albanesi, De Giorgi, 
and Nosal [2016] using Equifax data).9 This set of facts is most consistent 
with the expectations view, where borrowers took out mortgages against 
inflated house price values and defaulted when house prices dropped.
In light of the evidence presented above, it is important to understand 
why some of the earlier empirical literature about the housing crisis ar-
rived at different conclusions to rule out the relevance of the expecta-
tions view. The subprime view as proposed in Mian and Sufi (2009) 
relies on two main findings. First, the authors suggest that there was 
a disproportionate flow of new mortgage debt to low- income house-
holds. This finding seems to be in direct contrast to the findings docu-
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mented above. The discrepancy stems from the fact that Mian and Sufi 
(2009) use mortgage and income data aggregated up to the ZIP Code 
level, and not the household level. At the ZIP Code level, mortgage 
credit can go up for two reasons: either because there is an increase in 
average mortgage size (DTI) or because of an increase in originations 
in a ZIP Code due to quicker selling and buying of houses (churn).10 As 
shown in Adelino et al. (2016), the negative correlation between mort-
gage growth and income growth at the ZIP Code level is entirely driven 
by the increase in the rate of churn across neighborhoods.11 Therefore, 
once we decompose these different margins of credit flows, there is no 
 cross- sectional dislocation in either credit flows or homeownership 
rates to  lower- income or marginal households.
A second major argument to rule out that expectations were the key 
driver for the credit expansion is that it was instead subprime lending in 
a ZIP Code (as a proxy for distorted incentives) that drove house price 
growth. On average, it is the case that neighborhoods with a higher 
share of subprime lenders (and loans) had quicker credit expansion, 
since these lenders tend to be in neighborhoods that saw quicker house 
price growth. However, there is significant heterogeneity in house price 
growth and the share of subprime loans between neighborhoods. If we 
do a simple  double- sort of ZIP Codes by the market share of subprime 
lenders and the growth in house prices between 2002 and 2006,12 we 
see that growth in mortgage origination sorts strongly with house 
price growth, independent of the level of subprime lenders in the ZIP 
Code. This means that credit went up significantly, even in areas with 
a small fraction of subprime lenders but high house price appreciation. 
The correlation is much weaker in the other direction: once we control 
for house price growth in an area, there is only a weak correlation be-
tween mortgage growth with the share of subprime lending. This sug-
gests that, even though subprime lenders tend to be located more often 
in neighborhoods that experienced higher house price growth in the 
boom, they are unlikely to be driving the growth. While it is, of course, 
not possible to establish causality with this type of  cross- sectional anal-
ysis, the results again point to the role of asset prices, even when ex-
plaining where subprime lending expanded and where not.
In sum, a careful review of the major trends in mortgage markets 
leading up to the 2008 crisis casts doubt on a one- sided explanation 
of the events as a subprime crisis. The results presented here support 
a view of the boom in which financial institutions and banks bought 
into increasing house prices because of overly optimistic expectations. 
This  broad- based increase in borrowing and housing prices might have 
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been triggered initially through lower interest rates at the beginning of 
the  twenty- first century. In turn, credit standards may have fallen as a 
result of higher house prices because lenders were too willing to rely on 
collateral values alone.
Our results also show why it is important to understand the drivers 
of the crisis. We show that, after 2008, credit to  lower- income borrowers 
dropped dramatically and prompted a significant decline in homeown-
ership rates for low- income households. Seen through the lens of the 
subprime view, one might have welcomed the change in mortgage mar-
kets as a sign that marginal or low- income groups were now success-
fully being screened out. Under the expectations view, however, these 
facts raise the concern that regulatory changes that more significantly 
affected  lower- income households prevented them from buying houses 
when prices were historically low, without improving the stability of 
the mortgage market.
I.  Data Description
We use four main sources of data. First, for all  household- level survey 
data we rely on the American Community Survey (ACS one- year and 
five- year public use microdata samples [PUMS]), an annual survey con-
ducted by the census of US households. This is the most reliable data 
source that allows us to jointly analyze a household’s homeownership 
and employment status, financial situation, and demographic situa-
tion. We also use census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000 for computing 
historical homeownership rates in figure 7 (similar to, among others, 
Acolin, Goodman, and Wachter, forthcoming). Census data is obtained 
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series made available by the 
Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota (Ruggles 
et al. 2015).
In the appendix, we also confirm the reported time- series patterns 
of homeownership using the American Housing Survey (AHS) and 
the Current Population Survey (CPS)/Housing Vacancy Survey (CPS/
HVS), all from the census. The CPS/HVS is a widely cited survey on 
the aggregate homeownership rate in the United States, but it relies on 
a much smaller sample than the American Community Survey. As a 
result, estimates of the homeownership rate in subgroups over time are 
more reliable using the ACS, which is what we focus on. The appendix 
shows that, while there are differences in the baseline levels of home-
ownership between the different samples, our main results hold in all 
three data sets (ACS, AHS, and CPS/HVS).13
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Second, we use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data set, which contains the universe of US mortgage applications in 
each year. The variables of interest for our purposes are the loan amount, 
the purpose of the loan (purchase, refinance, or remodel), the action type 
(granted or denied), the lender identifier, the location of the borrower 
(state, county, and census tract), and the year of origination. We match 
census tracts from HMDA to ZIP Codes using the Missouri Census Data 
Center bridge. This is a many- to- many match, and we rely on popu-
lation weights to assign tracts to ZIP Codes. We drop ZIP Codes for 
which census tracts in HMDA cover less than 80% of a ZIP Code’s pop-
ulation. With this restriction, we arrive at 27,385 individual ZIP Codes 
in the data.
Third, we obtain house price data from both the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) (for  state- level house prices) and from Zillow. 
The ZIP- Code- level house prices are estimated using the median house 
price for all homes in a ZIP Code as of June of each year. Zillow house 
prices are available for only 8,619 ZIP Codes in the HMDA sample for 
this period, representing approximately 77% of the total mortgage orig-
ination volume in HMDA.
Fourth, we also use a loan- level data set from LPS that contains de-
tailed information on the loan and borrower characteristics for both 
purchase mortgages and mortgages used to refinance existing debt. 
This data set is provided by the mortgage servicers, and we have access 
to a 5% sample of the data. The LPS data include not only loan char-
acteristics at origination, but also the performance of loans after origi-
nation, allowing us to look at ex post delinquency and defaults. One 
constraint of using the LPS data is that coverage improves over time, so 
we start the analysis in 2003 when we use this data set. Coverage of the 
prime market by the LPS data is relatively stable at 60% during this pe-
riod, but its coverage of the subprime market is lower (at around 30%) 
at the beginning of the sample and improves to close to 50% at the end 
of the sample (Amromin and Paulson 2009).
Finally, to look at the role of collateral and loan- to- value in the hous-
ing market, we use a data set from CoreLogic (formerly DataQuick) 
that includes all ownership transfers of residential properties available 
in deeds and assessors’ records over 17 years (from 1996 to 2012) across 
metropolitan areas in all 50 states. Each observation in the data contains 
the date of the transaction, the amount for which a house was sold, the 
size of the first, second, and third mortgages, and an extensive set of 
characteristics of the property itself.
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II.  Summary Statistics
We show summary statistics for the 2000 Census and the ACS five- year 
sample in table 1. The first set of statistics refer to real median income in 
each sample (2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015), as well as the maximum nomi-
nal income for quintiles 1 through 4. The income threshold for house-
holds in the lowest quintile is $18,000 as of 2000, and about $23,000 as 
of 2015, both well below half the median income of households in those 
periods (note, again, that we report real median income; the median 
Table 1
Summary Statistics
   2000  2005  2010  2015
A. Income (median, 2000 dollars) 41,900 40,122 39,385 40,161
Upper Bound of each Quintile: 
Quintile 1 (lowest income) 18,000 19,000 20,200 22,900
Quintile 2 33,300 36,000 39,000 43,400
Quintile 3 51,400 56,800 61,900 70,000
Quintile 4 80,000 90,000 99,800 112,250
B. Homeowner (%) 66.2 67.5 65.3 63.1
Quintile 1 (lowest income) 43.1 42.5 39.2 38.8
Quintile 2 56.5 57.3 55.4 53.1
Quintile 3 67.0 68.6 66.6 64.0
Quintile 4 77.7 80.0 77.8 75.0
Quintile 5 (highest income) 86.9 89.6 87.6 85.1
C. Percent movers (over last 12 months, %) 7.9 8.2 4.9 5.8
Quintile 1 (lowest income) 6.4 6.6 4.4 4.8
Quintile 2 7.8 7.6 4.6 5.2
Quintile 3 8.4 9.0 5.3 6.0
Quintile 4 8.9 8.7 5.2 6.2
Quintile 5 (highest income) 7.7 8.3 4.7 6.2
D. Housing cost/income (movers, %) 26.2 31.0 28.1 24.9
Quintile 1 (lowest income) 52.3 63.9 60.8 59.4
Quintile 2 32.4 39.5 35.1 32.2
Quintile 3 25.7 31.1 27.4 23.9
Quintile 4 21.0 25.3 22.3 20.0
Quintile 5 (highest income) 17.1 19.7 17.5 15.0
Number of observations  5,663,214  1,245,246  1,397,789  1,496,678
Notes: Data from the 2000 Census and the American Community Survey. Panel A shows 
the income median per year in 2000 dollars in the first row (real income) and then nomi-
nal income upper bound for each income quintile. Panel B shows the percentage of home-
owners per year and income quintile. Panel C shows the percentage of homeowners than 
moved within the last 12 months per year and income quintile. Panel D shows the hous-
ing cost as a percentage of income shown for homeowners who moved within the last year.
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nominal income as of 2015 in the ACS was $55,000). This is important 
to keep in mind when we introduce the results on the share of income 
spent on housing for each income group.
While we discuss the evolution of homeownership rates in much more 
detail below, this table shows the level of homeownership for each quintile 
over time. The main takeaway is that homeownership rates sort strongly 
with income levels. Households in the lowest quintile hover around 40%, 
those in the second are about 15 percentage points higher, and households 
at the very top have a homeownership rate that is above 85% in all years 
in the data since 2000, and reach close to 90% at the peak of the boom.
We also show summary statistics on the share of homeowners that 
move in the 12 months prior to the survey year. About 8% of homeown-
ers move in each year during the boom period (2000 and 2005), and this 
drops significantly during the crisis to about 5%. This pattern is gener-
ally visible for all income quintiles.
Finally, table 1 shows the average cost of housing as a proportion of 
household income for homeowners that moved over the last 12 months. 
Housing costs include, according to the Census Bureau, “payments for 
mortgages ( . . . ) (including payments for the first mortgage, second 
mortgages, home equity loans, and other junior mortgages); real estate 
taxes; [all] insurance on the property; utilities (electricity, gas, and wa-
ter and sewer) ( . . . ). It also includes, where appropriate, the monthly 
condominium fee for condominiums and mobile home costs.” The av-
erage for all homeowners is between 25 and 31% over our sample, with 
significant variation across income quintiles. Households in the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution spend over 50% of their income on 
housing, whereas those at the top are at 20% or below. Variation in the 
share of income spent on housing tracks the evolution of house prices 
during this period.
III.  Distribution of Purchase Mortgages
We first report a direct measure of the dynamics of purchase mortgage 
origination between 2001 and 2015. We focus on the 8,619 ZIP Codes for 
which we have house price information from Zillow, the same sample 
used in Adelino et al. (2016). We split the sample into quintiles based on 
the median household income from the IRS in each ZIP Code as of 2002 
so that ZIP Codes do not move across quintiles over time.
In 2001, the top quintile of households by income represented approx-
imately 35% of the total purchase mortgage volume originated in the 
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United States (figure 1). The top two quintiles made up 60% of the total, 
while the bottom quintile accounted for less than 10%. As the hous-
ing boom progresses, the share of the bottom three quintiles increases, 
especially in 2004–2006, to a peak of 47% in 2006 (from 40% at the be-
ginning of the period). This increase is shared across the bottom three 
Fig. 1. Distribution of mortgage debt by income quintile
Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of total dollar volume of purchase mortgages by in-
come quintile, and panel B shows the total dollar volume. We use household income from 
the IRS as of 2002 (i.e., the ZIP Codes in each bin are fixed over time). The cutoff for the 
bottom quintile corresponds to an average household income in the ZIP Code as of 2002 
of $34,000, the second quintile corresponds to $40,000, the third quintile corresponds to 
$48,000, and the fourth quintile corresponds to $61,000. Sample includes 8,619 ZIP Codes 
described in the “Data and Summary Statistics” section. Panel A: Share by income quin-
tile (IRS ZIP Code income). Panel B: Total volume by income quintile (in USD billions).
a
b
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quintiles and is not concentrated in the poorest households. This trend 
reverses in 2006, when the share of the top ZIP Codes by income starts 
expanding significantly. This is especially pronounced for the top quin-
tile of the distribution, where the share of purchase mortgages goes 
from 30.3% in 2006 to 38.7% in 2012 and 2013. All bottom three quintiles 
suffer a reduction in approximately equal proportions. This is consis-
tent with other evidence on the contraction of mortgage credit to low- 
income households described in the literature (including, among many 
others, the quarterly Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Household 
Debt and Credit Reports). Panel B shows the pronounced increase and 
decrease in overall volume of purchase mortgage origination during 
this period for the 8,619 ZIP Codes in our data. Figure A2 in the appen-
dix shows that the distribution of purchase mortgage was also stable 
across the FICO score distribution.14
In table 2 we show that the growth in mortgage lending between 
2002 and 2006 is strongly driven by house price movements, and much 
less so by variation in the fraction of loans that were made by subprime 
lenders as of 2002. To show this, we sort ZIP Codes into quartiles based 
on the fraction of loans in a ZIP Code that are originated by subprime 
lenders as of 2002 (based on the US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development [HUD] subprime lender list), as well as the house price 
growth in the ZIP Code between 2002 and 2006.15 This allows us to con-
sider the separate roles of the presence of subprime lenders (as a mea-
sure of aggressive supply of mortgages) and house prices in the growth 
in mortgage origination in the 2002–2006 period. In panel C we show 
that the house price dimension is much more important for explaining 
the growth in total mortgage origination than the share of lending done 
by subprime lenders.
IV.  Stock of Debt
The distribution of purchase mortgage could potentially tell us an in-
complete story of the stock of household leverage if households across 
income groups (a) differentially retire or refinance existing debt, (b) in-
crease the speed at which they buy and sell houses (churn), or (c) change 
the likelihood of entering into homeownership. Figure 2 uses data from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances tracking the entire stock of mortgage 
debt, including purchase mortgages, second liens, and other home equity 
lines. It shows that the stock of DTI at the household level increased 
proportionally across the whole income distribution.
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V.  Housing Costs
We next focus on the sample of movers in the American Community 
Survey (ACS) and show that the cost of owning a home increases for all 
quintiles during the housing boom and that it closely tracks the evolu-
tion of house prices (figure 3). We use housing costs as a percentage of 
income for recent movers as our measure of debt burden. We focus on re-
cent movers to proxy for individuals that recently obtained a new mort-
gage to avoid confounding what happens with the stock of homeowners 
with the flow of new credit. Housing costs in the ACS include mortgage 
Table 2
Summary Statistics by House Price Growth and Subprime Origination
A. Distribution of ZIP Codes
   Low HP Growth  2  3  High HP Growth
Low subprime 535 651 646 338
2 639 610 522 398
3 583 604 484 483
High subprime 435  351  539  801
B. Fraction of Total Purchase Mortgages Originated by Subprime Lenders (as of 2006)
   






High HP Growth 
(%)
Low subprime 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.3
2 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.0
3 12.6 12.4 12.5 12.7
High subprime 22.8  22.1  23.3 26.1
C. Annualized Growth in Total Purchase Mortgage Origination
   






High HP Growth 
(%)
Low subprime 7.1 11.3 10.2 14.8
2 7.5 11.0 12.1 15.3
3 7.2 12.1 13.2 17.9
High subprime 8.1  13.6  15.9 18.2
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics by ZIP Code split by quartiles of the propor-
tion of purchase mortgages originated by subprime lenders (subprime lenders are defined 
by the HUD subprime lender list), as well as quartiles of house price growth between 
2002 and 2006. Panel A shows the number of ZIP Codes associated to each subprime/
house price growth cell. Panel B shows the fraction of subprime lenders with respect to all 
mortgages originated in 2006 in that particular cell. Panel C shows the mortgage growth 
between 2002 and 2006 within each cell. Data from HMDA, and the sample includes ZIP 
Codes with nonmissing house price data from Zillow.
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payments and any other costs associated with owning a home (taxes, 
insurance, and utilities, among others). Figure 3 shows the evolution of 
housing costs for the top four quintiles16. The increase in housing costs is 
somewhat higher for the second quintile (at about 6 percentage points) 
between 2001 and 2006, and it is about 2–4 percentage points for the 
other groups. This cost drops significantly for all income groups starting 
in 2006, and in all cases is below the 2001 level by the end of the sample 
period (2015). One caveat to this analysis is that we cannot control for 
changes in the geographic composition of the sample in each income 
quintile. If areas with different housing costs increase or decrease their 
weight in the sample of movers over time (which likely happens over 
the house price cycle), this can change the interpretation of the results.
For comparison, panel B shows the cost of renting a home for recent 
movers. The cost of renting increased consistently throughout the whole 
sample period, including during and after the financial crisis, for all in-
come quintiles in the data. Panel C shows the difference between the 
costs of owning and renting. The gap in cost for the second income quin-
tile starts at zero, meaning that recent movers spent the same fraction of 
Fig. 2.  Mortgage- related DTI by income level
Notes: The figure shows the  value- weighted mean DTI of households in the Survey of 
Consumer Finances. DTI is defined as the ratio of all  mortgage- related debt over an-
nual household income. The sample includes households with positive mortgage debt. 
As of 2004, the cutoff for the bottom quintile corresponds to an annual household income 
of $25,300, the second quintile corresponds to $44,300, the third quintile corresponds to 
$69,700, and the fourth quintile corresponds to $112,700.  Mortgage- related debt includes 
SCF items MRTHEL (Mortgage and Home Equity Loan, Primary Residence) and RESDBT 
(Other residential debt). This figure appears originally in Adelino et al. (2016).
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Fig. 3. Annual housing cost as a percentage of income (recent movers)
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Notes: Figure shows the evolution of median housing costs by household income quin-
tile. Recent movers are defined as those who bought a home within the last year. Housing 
costs in the ACS include mortgage payments and any other costs associated with own-
ing a home (taxes, insurance, utilities, among others). Costs are shown as a percentage 
of household income. The same plots including the first quintile are in figure A3. Panel 
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income on housing irrespective of whether they owned or rented. This 
gap increases to 4% of income at the peak of the boom, and then drops by 
a full 10% of income by 2013, consistent with a model in Kaplan, Mitman, 
and Violante (2016). For the top 60% of households, ownership is associ-
ated with a higher cost of housing (by about 4–5 percentage points). This 
increases slightly by the peak of the boom, and then drops in the bust, to 
where the cost of owning and renting is the same within each bin.
Figure 4 shows these patterns broken out by states with above and 
below median house price appreciation. Overall, the message from this 
figure is that the patterns from the previous figure are significantly more 
pronounced for areas with a larger boom- bust cycle. Panel A shows that 
households in quintiles 2 and 3 experience an increase of about 8 per-
centage points in the cost of housing as a share of income during the 
housing boom. Quintile 4 has an average increase of 6 points, and the 
highest quintile of about 4 points. In contrast, panel B shows smaller 
increases for all groups of households in states with smaller house price 
increases, as well as smaller reductions in the crisis.
Table 3 shows regressions of the  household- level cost of owning a 
home on a linear time variable (“year”), as well as its square. All re-
gressions control for age and the number of children, as well as state 
fixed effects. We see a large increase in the burden of housing for all 
income quintiles, but the results show significantly different patterns 
for quintiles 3 through 5 during this time period. The difference in the 
predicted values from this regression amounts to about 1–2 percentage 
points per quintile at the very peak of the boom. These differences com-
pletely disappear at the end of the sample, consistent with the patterns 
in figures 3 and 4. Columns (2) and (3) split the sample into “boom” and 
“nonboom” states, and we see that quintiles 1 through 3 are relatively 
homogeneous in their behavior in boom states, and that quintiles 4 and 
5 exhibit statistically different patterns.
VI.  Value of Housing as a Proportion of Income
We next consider the evolution of the value of homes as a proportion of 
household income (the  value- to- income ratio). We use  value- to- income 
ration rather than the debt- to- income ratio because data on mortgage 
balance is not available in the American Community Survey. However, 
in light of the evidence provided in the next section about the stability 
of the proportion of housing that was financed with debt, particularly 
over the boom, and especially for low- priced homes, it is reasonable to 
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assume that debt to income followed a similar path to value to income. 
We calculate the value to income for households that purchased a home 
in the previous 12 months. This avoids confounding the stock of house-
holds with the flow of purchases, and provides a better picture of the 
availability of credit and the decisions made by both financial institu-
tions and households.
Fig. 4. Change in housing cost as a percentage of income (recent movers, owners only)
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Notes: Figure shows the change in median housing costs by household income quintile. 
Recent movers defined as those who bought a home within the last year. Housing costs in 
the ACS include mortgage payments and any other costs associated with owning a home 
(taxes, insurance, utilities, among others). Costs are shown as a percentage of household 
income. Panel A: “boom” areas (above median state HPA); panel B: “nonboom” areas 
(below median state HPA).
a
b
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Value to income increased for households across the whole income 
distribution (figure 5). The average increase is the same for all house-
holds above the 20th percentile up to 2005, and 2006 shows a somewhat 
larger increase for the second quintile than for the rest of the households. 
A similar pattern emerges when we focus only on the states with above 
median increases in house prices, where the 2005–2006 increase is par-
ticularly pronounced for the second quintile than for the rest, but where 
otherwise both the run- up and the fall in the ratio of housing to income 
is similar for all quintiles. Panel B also shows that the cycle in this ratio 
is much stronger in high house price appreciation areas, consistent with 
Table 3
Housing Cost as a Percentage of Income (Movers Only)
   All  Boom  Nonboom
Year 2.5186*** 3.1746*** 2.0464**
  0.4910 0.4513 0.5614
Year2 –0.1635*** –0.2041*** –0.1343**
  0.0338 0.0322 0.0365
Quintile 2 × year –0.1164 0.2980 –0.3280
  0.1359 0.1624 0.3460
Quintile 2 × year2 –0.0116 –0.0476** 0.0091
  0.0090 0.0113 0.0211
Quintile 3 × year –0.6143* –0.1687 –0.9643*
  0.2442 0.3375 0.3728
Quintile 3 × year2 0.0200 –0.0120 0.0450
  0.0167 0.0258 0.0234
Quintile 4 × year –0.9986** –0.8833*** –1.1932*
  0.2460 0.1997 0.4325
Quintile 4 × year2 0.0473** 0.0364* 0.0625*
  0.0154 0.0130 0.0258
Quintile 5 × year –1.4978*** –1.6875*** –1.5685**
  0.3026 0.2285 0.4044
Quintile 5 × year2 0.0805** 0.0894*** 0.0870**
  0.0192 0.0126 0.0255
Age + children controls Y Y Y
Quintile dummies Y Y Y
State F.E. Y Y Y
Number of obs. 526,480 245,588 280,892
R2  0.4  0.38  0.42
Note: Data from the American Community Survey. Boom areas defined as states with 
above median growth in house prices. Weighted OLS regressions using ACS weights.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the evidence in figures 3 and 4 on the cost of owning homes. We show 
the  value- to- income ratio for households in the bottom quintile in figure 
A4 in the appendix. The burden of housing for the  lowest- income house-
holds is clearly much higher than that of the top 80%, but the general 
pattern again closely tracks the variation in house prices.
Table 4 performs a regression analysis that is similar to table 3, but 
using the value of housing as a proportion of income as the dependent 
variable. Similar to the regressions in table 3, we again see a strong 
Fig. 5. House  value- to- income ratio (recent movers)
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Note: Figure shows the change in median value of homes as a share of household income 
by income quintile. Recent movers defined as those who bought a home within the last 
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boom and bust cycle that coincides with house price movements. The 
predicted values from the regression again show that there is a large 
increase in the multiple of house value over income for all households, 
with a particularly strong cycle for quintiles 1 and 2. This is especially 
pronounced for boom states (column [2]).
VII.  Homeownership
We next turn to the evolution of homeownership rates during the hous-
ing boom and bust. Homeownership rates provide a good measure of 
Table 4
House Value a Percentage of Income (Movers Only)
   All  Boom  Nonboom
Year 0.5740** 1.0866*** 0.3009*
  0.1627 0.2019 0.1094
Year2 –0.0376** –0.0705*** –0.0198*
  0.0120 0.0153 0.0080
Quintile 2 × year –0.0700 –0.2094* –0.0404
  0.0493 0.0707 0.0485
Quintile 2 × year2 0.0048 0.0130* 0.0033
  0.0033 0.0052 0.0034
Quintile 3 × year –0.2263** –0.4606*** –0.1642*
  0.0682 0.0879 0.0609
Quintile 3 × year2 0.0139** 0.0283*** 0.0102
  0.0042 0.0054 0.0048
Quintile 4 × year –0.2821** –0.6103*** –0.1710*
  0.0858 0.1137 0.0653
Quintile 4 × year2 0.0177** 0.0381*** 0.0108*
  0.0054 0.0073 0.0049
Quintile 5 × year –0.3356* –0.7402*** –0.1898*
  0.1154 0.1532 0.0638
Quintile 5 × year2 0.0211* 0.0468*** 0.0116*
  0.0070 0.0102 0.0048
Age + children controls Y Y Y
Quintile dummies Y Y Y
State F.E. Y Y Y
Number of obs. 515,866 240,279 275,587
R2  0.25  0.25  0.23
Note: Data from the American Community Survey. Boom areas defined as states with 
above median growth in house prices. Weighted OLS regressions using ACS weights.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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the net effect of the expansion of mortgage credit to different house-
holds over time (see also Foote, Loewenstein, and Willen 2016). To the 
extent that credit availability increased for certain groups in the popula-
tion, we would expect those groups to switch at a higher rate from rent-
ing into owning, particularly in the case of groups with lower average 
homeownership rates. We calculate homeownership rates as the num-
ber of households who own their home as a share of all households in 
each income quintile. The data comes from the American Community 
Survey one- year surveys, and it covers the 2001 to 2015 period.
Households in the bottom quintile experienced a reduction in home-
ownership rates during the whole period between 2001 and 2015 (fig-
ure 6, panel A, shows the evolution of homeownership for all quin-
tiles of the income distribution). The increase in homeownership rates 
is almost monotonically increasing in income in the period before the 
crisis. In fact, households between the 20th and the 40th percentiles ex-
perienced a noticeably smaller increase in homeownership rate than 
all three quintiles above. The cumulative change in the homeowner-
ship rate is about 1 percentage point for the second quintile, whereas 
it peaks at 2–2.5% for quintiles 3 through 5. Panel A includes all states, 
panel B focuses on states with above median increases in house prices, 
and panel C restricts the sample to just the four “sand states” (Arizona, 
California, Florida, and Nevada), where the housing boom was particu-
larly pronounced.
The crisis and recession period is clearly associated with an over-
all reduction in the rate of homeownership. Our analysis shows that 
the reduction was widely shared across the income distribution. The 
 lowest- income households experience a very strong reduction that 
starts in 2006 and flattens out by 2011. All other quintiles experience a 
steadily lower homeownership rate that undoes the whole increase of 
the boom and ends up 2–3 percentage points below their level in 2001 
by the year 2015.
Panel B shows that states with rapid house price appreciation experi-
enced similar moves in homeownership rates as other states. Specifically, 
households in the lower two income quintiles seem to have generally 
smaller increases before the crisis, and a significant reduction in home-
ownership rates after the crisis. It is notable, however, that the three top 
quintiles show a fast reduction in the rate of homeownership after the 
housing bust. In panel C, we find generally similar patterns as before.
In order to verify the robustness of the overall patterns shown in fig-
ure 6, we turn to the American Housing Survey (AHS) and the Current 
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Fig. 6. Cumulative change in homeownership rate
Notes: Figure shows the share of homeowners within each household income quintile in 
the American Community Survey one- year public use microdata sample. Homeowner-
ship rate is calculated as the share of  owner- occupied homes over the total number of 
occupied homes.
House price appreciation is measured between 2001 and 2006. Panel A: all states; panel B: 




This content downloaded from 018.101.008.189 on February 28, 2019 07:40:48 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Dynamics of Housing Debt in the Recent Boom and Great Recession 289
Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey (CPS/HVS) and perform 
the same analysis.17 We show those results in figure A5 in the appendix. 
Both the AHS and the CPS/HVS show smaller cumulative increases in 
the rate of homeownership for households with below median income 
before the crisis, and large drops after 2007–2008. These results are also 
consistent with the evidence in Foote, Loewenstein, and Willen (2016), 
who use the Survey of Consumer Finances and find no evidence that 
increases in homeownership were concentrated in low- income or mar-
ginal borrowers.
Table 5 shows regressions of homeownership status at the individual 
level on a linear and a quadratic time variable (“year”), as well as in-
teractions of the years with each quintile. Figure A6 shows a plot of 
the predicted values of this regression for ease of interpretation. These 
regressions include age of the head of household and the number of 
children as controls, as well as state fixed effects. The coefficients show 
that the increase in homeownership rate is significantly higher for 
quintiles 3 through 5 relative to quintiles 1 and 2. The quadratic term 
is also significantly different for quintiles 2 through 5 relative to the 
 lowest- income households, which closely mirrors the evidence shown 
in figure 6. Columns (2) and (3) show that the differences across groups 
stem mostly from nonboom states. In fact, we find that only quintiles 
4 and 5 are significantly different (with larger increases in the boom) 
in the boom states relative to the lowest income quintile. Panel B re-
runs the same specification as in the regressions described above, but 
we form income quintiles within states rather than for the full (pooled) 
sample. The conclusions are the same as in panel A.
Figure 7 shows a longer time series using data from the decennial 
census in 1980, 1990, and 2000, combined with American Community 
Survey five- year PUMS data for 2005–2015. The five- year ACS samples 
produce more reliable estimates in subgroups than the one- year 
samples, but they are only available starting in 2005, which is why we 
use the one- year samples for our year- by- year estimates above.18 Panel 
A shows that there was a significant increase in homeownership rates 
overall in the 1990s, more so than during the 2000–2005 period. The 
postcrisis period was associated with a large drop in homeownership 
rates in the United States. Panel B confirms the results using the one- 
year ACS data in figure 6 for the post- 2000 period, and it also shows 
that households in quintiles 2 through 5 had already experienced a 
large increase in homeownership during the 1990s.
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Table 5
Homeownership Rate by Quintiles over Time
Panel A. Pooled Income Quintiles
   All  Boom  Nonboom
Year –0.0019 0.0006 –0.0035
  0.0020 0.0030 0.0020
Year2 –0.0001 –0.0002 0.0000
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Quintile 2 × year 0.0062** 0.0029 0.0087***
  0.0016 0.0025 0.0018
Quintile 2 × year2 –0.0004*** –0.0002 –0.0005***
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Quintile 3 × year 0.0113*** 0.0056 0.0157***
  0.0023 0.0033 0.0023
Quintile 3 × year2 –0.0007*** –0.0004* –0.0010***
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Quintile 4 × year 0.0121*** 0.0065 0.0169***
  0.0025 0.0039 0.0026
Quintile 4 × year2 –0.0008*** –0.0005* –0.0011***
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Quintile 5 × year 0.0109*** 0.0082* 0.0129***
  0.0022 0.0036 0.0019
Quintile 5 × year2 –0.0007*** –0.0006* –0.0008***
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Age + children controls Y Y Y
Quintile dummies Y Y Y
State F.E. Y Y Y
Number of obs. 13,803,090 6,558,031 7,245,059
R2  0.19  0.19  0.19
Panel B. Income Quintiles Formed within Each State
   All  Boom  Nonboom
Year –0.0014 0.0017 –0.0043
  0.0022 0.0034 0.0021
Year2 –0.0001 –0.0003 0.0000
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Quintile 2 × year 0.0059** 0.0051 0.0067**
  0.0017 0.0026 0.0020
Quintile 2 × year2 –0.0004** –0.0003 –0.0004**
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Quintile 3 × year 0.0097** 0.0054 0.0136***
  0.0025 0.0040 0.0031
Quintile 3 × year2 –0.0007*** –0.0004 –0.0009***
  0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
Quintile 4 × year 0.0119*** 0.0075 0.0159***
  0.0027 0.0045 0.0030
(continued)
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Table A1 in the appendix uses the five- year ACS PUMS sample for 
the 2005–2014 period as an additional yearly check on the estimates 
described for figure 6 (obtained with the one- year ACS sample). The 
table shows that there is a difference of between 0.5% and 1% for 2005 
between the homeownership rates obtained in two samples, but no evi-
dence that this is different for the bottom two quintiles relative to the 
rest. The difference becomes smaller at 0–0.2% for all other years and 
income quintiles.
These patterns in homeownership rates may seem surprising given 
the increase in overall mortgage origination during the boom period, 
including in the number of purchase mortgages (Adelino et al. 2016). 
Our results show that the increase in mortgage origination in the ag-
gregate during this time period did not lead to greater access to home-
ownership by individuals at the bottom of the income distribution, and 
led to relatively modest increases at the middle and the top of the distri-
bution. These results are consistent with Acolin et al. (2017), who show 
that subprime mortgage use at the county level was not associated with 
changes in the homeownership rate, including for low- income and mi-
nority households.
Quintile 4 × year2 –0.0008*** –0.0006* –0.0010***
  0.0001 0.0003 0.0002
Quintile 5 × year 0.0107*** 0.0074 0.0137***
  0.0022 0.0042 0.0015
Quintile 5 × year2 –0.0007*** –0.0006* –0.0008***
  0.0001 0.0003 0.0001
Age + children controls Y Y Y
Quintile dummies Y Y Y
State F.E. Y Y Y
Number of obs. 13,803,090 6,558,031 7,245,059
R2  0.19  0.19  0.19
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Note: Boom areas defined as states with above median growth in house prices. 
Weighted OLS regressions using ACS weights. Figure A6 shows fitted values from 
the regression.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1
Continued
   All  Boom  Nonboom
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VIII.  Movers and Churn
The evidence on purchase mortgage originations shown in figure 1 
is based on ZIP Codes rather than individuals. We use data from the 
ACS to measure the fraction of homeowners moving homes in each 
year by income level of households rather than ZIP Codes. We show 
these results in figure 8. We find that already in 2001 about 8% of house-
holds in income quintiles 3 and 4 moved homes in each year. This fig-
Fig. 7. Change in homeownership rate 1980–2015
Source: Data comes from the Decennial Census for 1980, 1990, and 2000, and from the 
American Community Survey five- year public use microdata sample for 2005–2015.
Note: Homeownership rate is calculated as the share of  owner- occupied homes over the 
total number of occupied homes. Panel A: all households; panel B: change in homeowner-
ship rate by income level.
a
b
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ure was closer to 7% for quintiles 2 and 5, and just below 6% for the 
 lowest- income households. We observe an increase in the share of mov-
ers during the boom, with a peak in 2005 that is close to 1% higher at 
all income levels.
The housing crisis is associated with a dramatic reduction in the rate 
of movers in the data, with all quintiles showing an average of between 
4 and 5% share of movers per year, with an increase in this rate starting 
in 2011. Importantly, all income levels seem to move in lockstep in both 
the boom and the bust, which again runs counter to the idea that the 
Fig. 8. Share of households moving in the last year (owners only)
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Note: Shares within each household income quintile. Panel A: all states; panel B: “boom” 
areas (above median state HPA).
a
b
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housing cycle was a phenomenon that was particularly pronounced at 
the bottom of the distribution. Panel B of figure 8 shows similar evi-
dence for states with above median house price appreciation. Although 
the shares of movers are slightly higher than those for all states (panel 
A), all the conclusions hold for high house price appreciation areas and 
the cycle follows a very similar path.
IX.  Loan- to- Value Ratios
We next consider the evolution of combined loan- to- value (LTV) ra-
tios of home purchases using data from deeds records between 2000 
and 2012 (from DataQuick, currently CoreLogic). We focus on arm’s- 
length transactions and include first, second, and third liens for com-
puting LTVs.
This analysis means to capture how the debt capacity of housing as 
an asset class changes over time, and addresses one of the main param-
eters used in a wide class of models to capture changes in credit con-
straints. Recent evidence from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
shows the evolution of combined loan- to- value ratios for all households 
(not just LTVs at origination).19 We also show the loan- to- value ratio 
for all households from the Flow of Funds data in figure A7. Both the 
evidence from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Flow 
of Funds shows the combined position of US households in terms of 
home equity and includes the evolution of house prices since a home 
was purchased, as well as the changes in leverage over time (i.e., the 
stock of loan- to- value ratios in the economy). These measures include 
the addition of home equity lines of credit and cash- out refinances, as 
well as quicker buying and selling of homes (quicker churn) and reset-
ting of mortgages to higher levels. The purpose of the evidence in this 
section is, instead, to measure the debt capacity of housing over the 
recent housing cycle.
When we look at the loan- to- value ratios at origination, that is, the 
flow of LTVs of new purchases, we find very small changes over the 
boom- and- bust cycle across the whole distribution (panel A of figure 
9). Panel B shows the evolution of the median LTV for homes at dif-
ferent price levels. Again, as in panel A, these medians are remarkably 
stable, except for a reduction in LTVs at the peak of the boom for homes 
between the 25th and 50th percentiles. This evidence is consistent with 
the work of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015) and Ferreira 
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and Gyourko (2015), who similarly do not find that LTVs at the time of 
purchase changed very significantly during the boom. The patterns of 
CLTV at origination are very similar for states with above and below 
median house price appreciation during the boom (figure 10). Overall, 
the evidence on loan- to- value ratios is not consistent with an increase 
in one of the key parameters associated with a large relaxation of credit 
constraints, or, put differently, with a significant increase in the debt 
capacity of homes.
Fig. 9. Combined loan- to- value ration (CLTV) for home purchase by year
Source: Data comes from CoreLogic (formerly DataQuick).
Note: Sample includes all transactions with positive combined loan to value. Combined 
loan to value is computed as the sum of the first, second, and third liens taken up to six 
months after a home purchase transaction. Panel A: all transactions; panel B: median 
combined loan to value (CLTV) by level of house prices.
a
b
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X.  Mortgage Defaults during the Bust
We next show that high- credit- score households and high- income 
households significantly increase their share of overall delinquencies in 
the crisis. We show the share of delinquencies by income quintile and 
FICO scores in figure 11. Delinquency is defined as borrowers missing 
three or more payments within the first three years after origination. 
Panel A shows the evolution of the share of delinquent mortgages by 
Fig. 10. Combined loan- to- value ratio (CLTV) for boom and nonboom states
Source: Data comes from CoreLogic (formerly DataQuick).
Note: Sample includes all transactions with positive combined loan to value. Combined 
loan to value is computed as the sum of the first, second, and third liens taken up to six 
months after a home purchase transaction. Boom states are those with above median 
house price appreciation. Panel A: “boom” areas (above median state HPA); panel B: 
“nonboom” areas (above median state HPA).
a
b
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Fig. 11. Mortgage delinquency
Source: Data are from the 5% sample of the LPS (formerly McDash) data set.
Note: Panel A shows the fraction of total dollar volume of delinquent purchase mortgages 
by cohort, split by ZIP Code income quintile. A mortgage is defined as being delinquent 
if payments become more than 90 days past due (i.e., 90 days, 120 days, or more in fore-
closure or REO) at any point during the three years after origination. We use household 
income from the IRS as of 2002 (i.e., in all panels ZIP Codes are fixed as of 2002, and 
cutoffs are the same as those given in figure 1). Panel B shows the fraction of total dollar 
volume of delinquent purchase mortgages by cohort, split by credit scores. A FICO score 
of 660 corresponds to a widely used cutoff for subprime borrowers, and 720 is close to 
the median FICO score of borrowers in the data. This figure appears originally in Adelino 
et al. (2016). Panel A: IRS 2002 income quintile; panel B: FICO score; panel C: delinquency 
by house price growth.
a
b
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ZIP Code income. Panel B shows the same picture by borrower credit 
score. Prime borrowers represented 29% of delinquencies over the sub-
sequent three years for the 2003 cohort, but they make up 61% of de-
faults for loans originated in 2006. Finally, panel C shows that when we 
split borrowers into areas with high and low house price growth during 
the boom, we observe that most of the increase in prime delinquencies 
in 2006 comes from loans originated in areas with high house apprecia-
tion, consistent with the important role of house prices for defaults.
XI.  Stability of Employment of Recent Movers
As a final test of possible changes in the underwriting standards during 
the credit boom, we show in figure 12 that households in all quintiles 
seem to have maintained similar characteristics in terms of the stability 
Fig. 11. (continued)
c
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of employment over the boom. The boom is associated with a decrease 
in the number of households that report having at least one household 
member with full- time employment of about 1–3 percentage points. 
Importantly, however, this change is common to all income levels, and 
it is not particularly concentrated in the poorest households. Another 
way of interpreting these results is that, once we account for household 
income by binning households into quintiles, this already accounts for 
Fig. 12. Stability of employment status (recent movers)
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Notes: Figure shows the median share of households who moved in the last 12 months 
in each income quintile who have stable employment. Stable employment is defined as 
having at least one full- time employed household member. Panel A: share of recent mov-
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many of the common characteristics of moving households. The mort-
gage crisis is associated with a sudden spike in the share of households 
with full- time employment, although this change is  short- lived for most 
groups (with the exception of the highest group).
XII.  Conclusion
In sum, a careful review of the major trends in mortgage markets lead-
ing up to the 2008 crisis calls into question a one- sided explanation of 
the events as a subprime crisis. The results presented in this paper sup-
port a view of the credit boom where financial institutions and banks 
bought into increasing house prices because of overly optimistic expec-
tations. The catalyst for the initial changes in mortgage demand and 
house price growth might have been a drop in interest rates in the early 
 twenty- first century that made home purchases more affordable and 
may have set off the feedback loop between increased house prices and 
increased expectations. Credit standards may have then fallen as a re-
sult of higher house prices, since lenders were willing to rely on collat-
eral values alone in making lending decisions. As our results confirm, 
the distribution of CLTV levels (for purchase mortgages at origination) 
stayed stable across the boom period, which suggests that lenders al-
most mechanically lent against increasing house price values.
Our results also show why it is important to understand the driv-
ers of the crisis. We show that post- 2008, credit to  lower- income and 
low- FICO borrowers dropped dramatically and prompted a significant 
decline in homeownership rates for  lower- income households. Seen 
through the lens of the subprime view, this might have been a welcome 
change in mortgage markets, since marginal or  lower- income groups 
were screened out. Under the expectations view, however, these facts 
raise the concern that these changes targeted  lower- income households 
and prevented them from buying houses when prices were historically 
low, without improving the stability of the mortgage market.
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Table A1
Comparison of ACS One- Year and ACS Five- year Estimates of Homeownership Rate, 
2005–2014
A. ACS One- Year
   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Q1 41.7 42.0 41.6 41.2 39.9 39.3 38.7 38.4 38.4 38.3
Q2 56.6 57.2 57.0 56.2 55.7 55.6 55.1 54.2 53.6 53.3
Q3 67.6 68.5 68.3 68.3 68.0 66.8 65.8 65.7 64.6 64.2
Q4 79.4 79.6 79.8 78.8 78.4 77.9 77.0 76.0 75.6 74.9
Q5 89.2  89.3  89.3  88.8  88.3  87.7  87.2  86.3  85.7  85.3
B. ACS Five- Year
   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014
Q1 42.5 42.1 41.6 41.2 40.1 39.2 38.6 38.5 38.5 38.4
Q2 57.3 57.2 57.1 56.1 55.7 55.4 54.9 54.1 53.7 53.3
Q3 68.6 68.6 68.3 68.2 68.1 66.6 65.7 65.6 64.6 64.2
Q4 80.0 79.7 80.1 78.8 78.6 77.8 76.9 76.0 75.6 74.9
Q5 89.6  89.2  89.3  88.7  88.3  87.6  87.2  86.3  85.7  85.3
C. ACS Five- Year/ACS One- Year
   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014
Q1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 –0.1 –0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Q2 0.7 0.1 0.1 –0.1 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0
Q3 1.0 0.1 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Q4 0.5 0.0 0.2 –0.1 0.2 –0.1 –0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Q5 0.4  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.0  0.0  –0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Note: The table shows homeownership rates across income quintiles computed using 
the ACS one- year public use microdata sample (panel A) and the ACS five- year sample 
(panel B). Panel C shows the difference between the two. Panel A uses the same data as 
figures 3–7. Five- year estimates are not available pre- 2005. For a detailed discussion of 
the differences between the samples, and the advantages and disadvantages of using 
each data set, please refer to http://www.census.gov/programs- surveys/acs/guidance/
estimates.html.
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Fig. A2. Mortgage origination by credit score
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of total dollar volume of purchase mortgages in the 
LPS data split by FICO score. A FICO score of 660 corresponds to a widely used cutoff for 
subprime borrowers, and 720 is near the median FICO score of borrowers in the LPS data 
(the median is 721 in 2003, 716 in 2004, 718 in 2005, and 715 in 2006). The sample includes 
ZIP Codes with nonmissing house price data from Zillow. This figure appears originally 
in Adelino et al. (2016).
Fig. A1. Mortgage approval rate by income
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of purchase mortgages in the HMDA that are approved 
each year over the total number of purchase mortgages applications in HMDA split by in-
come quintile. We use household income from the IRS as of 2002 (i.e., the ZIP Codes in each 
bin are fixed over time). The cutoff for the bottom quintile corresponds to an average house-
hold income in the ZIP Code as of 2002 of $34,000, the second quintile corresponds to $40,000, 
the third quintile corresponds to $48,000, and the fourth quintile corresponds to $61,000. 
Sample includes 8,619 ZIP Codes described in the “Data and Summary Statistics” section.
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Fig. A3. Distribution of annual housing cost as a percentage of income, recent movers
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Note: Medians within each income quintile. Recent movers defined as those who bought 
a home within the last two years. Income quintiles 1–5 shown. Panel A: owners; panel B: 
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Fig. A4. House value to income
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Note: Owners only, recent movers. Medians for each variable. Income quintiles 1–5 
shown. Panel A: “boom” areas (above median state HPA); panel B: “nonboom” areas 
(below median state HPA).
a
b
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Fig. A5. Change in homeownership rate by income, alternative data sources
Source: Data for CPS/HVS, panels B and C is obtained from https://www.census.gov/
housing/hvs/data/histtab17.xlsx, and for panel D from https://cps.ipums.org/cps/.
Note: Share of homeowners within each income quintile for the AHS and CPS/HVS 
(panels B through D). Panel A: American Housing Survey (AHS); panel B: Community 
Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey (CPS / HVS); panel C: Community Popula-
tion Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey (CPS/HVS)—adjusted for 2010 change in meth-
odology. Until 2010, householders not responding to the “income” question in the CPS/
HVS (panel B) were excluded from the homeownership calculations by family income 
level (this does not affect the overall US data). According to Census, “this change results 
in an increase in the homeownership rate of 1.5 percentage points for those at or below 
the median family income and an increase of 0.3 percentage points for those above the 
median family income level for the third quarter 2016.” This jump is visible in 2010 in 
panel B and it may help explain the smaller overall postcrisis drop for  below- median 
households in panel B relative to the ACS and the AHS figures (as the cumulative change 
shown for 2010–2015 is affected by this change). Here we adjust the post- 2010 data us-
ing the change of 0.3 and 1.5 percentage points reported by the census to construct an 
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Fig. A7. Evolution of aggregate combined loan- to- value from Flow of Funds data
Source: Data comes from Financial Accounts of the United  States- Z.1. Data from https://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/current/default.htm.
Note: The dashed line represents one minus the reported owner’s equity as a percentage 
of household real estate assets. The solid line shows the fraction of household mortgage 
liabilities over household real estate assets. The time period is from 1996 to 2012 with a 
quarterly frequency.
Fig. A6. Fitted values from table 5—homeownership by quintile and year
Source: Data from the American Community Survey.
Note: Coefficient from weighted OLS regressions using ACS weights in table 5.
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Endnotes
We thank the editors, Martin Eichenbaum and Jonathan A. Parker, and our discus-
sants, Erik Hurst and Gianluca Violante, for very insightful comments and suggestions. 
We also benefited from many helpful discussions with participants at the NBER Macro 
Annual Meeting. All mistakes are, of course, our own. The views expressed herein are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. For acknowledgments, sources of research support, and disclosure 
of the authors’ material financial relationships, if any, please see http://www.nber.org 
/chapters/c13919.ack.
1. Our data come from numerous sources, including the American Community Sur-
vey (ACS), the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), the Lender Processing Services 
(LPS) loan- level data set, and CoreLogic deeds record data.
2. Case and Schiller (2003) analyze how house price expectations form during housing 
bubbles, and Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante (2016) present a structural model that lays out 
the implications for consumption, homeownership, and leverage decisions.
3. An earlier literature assumed that  credit- constrained borrowers need collateral to 
borrow because of information asymmetries or limited contract enforcement (see, e.g., 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Gertler and Gilchrist 
1994; and Rampini and Vishwanathan 2010). If agency problems vary over the business 
cycle, it can lead to flight to quality and with it reduced collateral values in the bust. These 
models of the  collateral- lending channel assume rational homeowners and banks, and 
thus would not predict a crash in mortgage markets.
4. See Geanakoplos (2010) for a model of the  collateral- lending channel that produces 
endogenous boom- and- bust dynamics.
5. Several studies also suggest that the housing boom led to broader allocative distor-
tions, for example, on structural labor market imbalances, small business starts, or even 
students’ educational outcomes (see, e.g., Charles, Hurst, and Notowidgo 2015, 2016; and 
Adelino, Schoar, and Severino 2015).
6. A number of papers present evidence of the loosening of credit standards and in-
creased lending over the boom period (see, e.g., Loutskina and Strahan 2009; Keys et al. 
2010; Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011; Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 2012; Nadauld and 
Sherlund 2013; Agarwal et al. 2014). Although these studies are important in document-
ing the effects of the crisis, they do not speak directly to its origins.
7. Consistent with this fact, Greenwald (2016) argues that a cap on debt- to- income 
ratios, not loan- to- value ratios, is the more effective macroprudential policy for limiting 
boom- bust cycles.
8. This is the combination of all loans taken out on a home divided by the value of the 
asset.
9. It is a separate (and open) question whether there were “knock- on” effects from 
early defaults by one type of borrower, particularly subprime borrowers, on higher in-
come and prime borrowers later on. While this could have happened, the aggregate evi-
dence does not show clear lead- lag patterns in the delinquencies by different groups.
10. Take, for example, a situation where the fraction of households that buy homes in 
a given year increases from 6% to 8%, as we saw happened in the boom. If we sum the 
total new purchase mortgage debt at the ZIP Code level, it would look as if mortgage debt 
doubled even if DTIs and LTVs for all households stayed the same.
11. In addition, Mian and Sufi (2009) look at credit flows only between different ZIP 
Codes within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) rather than across the country 
as a whole.
12. Subprime lenders are defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, or HUD.
13. The CPS / HVS sample includes approximately 72,000 housing units, versus 500 thou-
sand to 1.5 million households in the ACS, depending on the year. The AHS is approximately 
the same size as CPS/HVS. For a more detailed comparison of the ACS, AHS, and CPS/
HVS data sets, please refer to https://www.census.gov/housing/homeownershipfactsheet 
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.html. The CPS/HVS sample is discussed in https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/
methodology/index.html and the ACS sample is described in http://www.census.gov 
/acs/www/methodology/sample- size- and- data- quality/sample- size/index.php.
14. LPS data is only available to us until 2009, thus we focus on the 2003 to 2006 period.
15. The HUD subprime lender list is available at https://www.huduser.gov/portal/
datasets/manu.html.
16. Appendix figure A3 shows the same figure including the bottom quintile. We ex-
clude the bottom quintile for ease of reading the figures, as the housing costs for this 
group are much higher than for the rest of the distribution. For example, the cost of hous-
ing as a percentage of income in 2001 is approximately 50% for the lowest income quintile 
and only 30% for the second quintile.
17. All three surveys (the ACS, the AHS, and the CPS/HVS) are administered by the 
census, and there are some differences in the levels of homeownership rates obtained 
across the three. For a detailed discussion about the pros and cons of each data set, please 
see https://www.census.gov/housing/homeownershipfactsheet.html.
18. Please see http://www.census.gov/programs- surveys/acs/guidance/estimates.
html for a description of the 1- year, 3- year, and 5- year ACS public use microdata samples.
19. http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/02/how- resilient- is- the- us 
- housing- market- now.html.
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